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CONSTITUTIONAL VISION
GEOFFREY R. STONE
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., is a committed civil libertarian who
believes that the Constitution guarantees "freedom and equality of rights and
opportunities... to all people of this nation." For Brennan, courts are the last
resort of the politically disenfranchised and the politically powerless and
constitutional litigation is often "the sole practicable avenue open to a minority
to petition for redress of grievances." Thus, in Brennan's view, the courts play
an indispensable role in the enforcement, interpretation, and implementation of
the most cherished guarantees of the United States Constitution. As Brennan
observed, the Constitution's "broadly phrased guarantees ensure that [it] need
never become an anachronism: the Constitution will endure as a vital charter
of human liberty as long as there are those with the courage to defend it, the
vision to interpret it, and the fidelity to live by it."'
Brennan was especially influential in the areas of Equal Protection, Due
Process, freedom of expression and criminal procedure. In his interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause, Brennan evinced little tolerance for invidious
governmental discrimination. When Brennan joined the Court in 1956, the
Equal Protection Clause was high on the Court's agenda for the Court had just
handed down its explosive decisions in Brown v. Board of Education I 2 and
Brown v. Board of Education IM1 Despite these decisions, and to the Court's
mounting frustration, segregation of southern schools remained largely intact
more than a decade after Brown. In Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County," however, Brennan's opinion for the Court finally dismantled the last
serious barriers to desegregation by invalidating the "freedom of choice" plans
that had been used to forestall desegregation in the rural south. Putting aside
the "all deliberate speed" formula, Brennan emphatically expressed his own and
the Court's impatience at the pace of desegregation: "The burden on a school
board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work,
and promises realistically to work now."
* Dean and Harry Kalven, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; Law Clerk
to Justice William Brennan, October 1972 Term.
1. WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and The Progress of the Law", 10 CARDOzo L.
REv. 3, 12 (1988).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
4. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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When the Court first considered the lawfulness of school segregation in a
northern city that had never expressly mandated racially segregated education
by statute, it was again Brennan, writing for a closely-divided Court in Keyes
v. School District Number One, Denver, Colorado,5 who took a strong stand on
the issue:
A finding of intentionally segregative school board action in a
meaningful portion of a school system... creates a presumption that
other segregated schooling within the system in not adventitious [and]
shifts to school authorities the burden of proving that other segregated
schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally
segregative actions.
Although Brennan naturally assumed a leadership role in condemning
discrimination against racial minorities, he sharply distinguished race-conscious
"affirmative action" programs designed to protect such minorities. Brennan
explained the distinction in his separate opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,:6
Against the background of our history, claims that law must be 'color'
blind or that the datum of race is no longer relevant to public policy
must be seen as aspiration rather than as description of reality. [We]
cannot... let color blindness become myopia which masks the reality
that many 'created equal' have been treated within our lifetimes as
inferior both by law and by their fellow citizens.
Brennan therefore concluded that the purpose of "remedying the effects of past
societal discrimination is... sufficiently important to justify the use of race-
conscious" affirmative action programs "where there is a sound basis for
concluding that minority representation is substantial and chronic and that the
handicap of past discrimination is impeding access of minorities to the [field]."
Brennan also played a pivotal role in the evolution of the Equal Protection
doctrine in the area of gender discrimination. In Frontiero v. Richardson,'
Brennan, writing for a plurality of four Justices, argued that classifications based
on sex are inherently suspect and, like racial classifications, must be subjected
to strict scrutiny. Taking a strong stand on the issue, Brennan explained that
"our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination ' and
this history has traditionally been "rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic
5. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
6. 438 U.s. 265 (1978).
7. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
8. Id. at 684.
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paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a
cage."
Although Brennan never garnered the crucial fifth vote for this position, he
did gain a decisive victory in Craig v. Boren9, in which the Court held that
gender-based classifications must be subjected to intermediate scrutiny. "To
withstand constitutional analysis," he wrote, such classifications "must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."
Brennan also opened the door to the Court's reapportionment revolution.
Prior to 1962, the Court had consistently declined to consider claims that state
laws prescribing legislative districts that were not approximately equal in
population violated the Constitution. As Justice Frankfurter explained in
Colegrove v. Green"1, such controversies concern "matters that bring courts
into immediate and active relations with party contests," and "courts ought not
to enter this political thicket." In Baker v. Carr," Brennan rejected this
reasoning and held that a claim that the apportionment of the Tennessee General
Assembly violated the appellants' rights under the Equal Protection Clause "by
virtue of the debasement of their votes" stated "a justiciable cause of action."
Brennan explained that "the question here is the consistency of state action with
the Federal Constitution," and such claims are not non-justiciable merely
"because they touch matters of state governmental organization." Brennan's
opinion for the court in Baker led the way to Reynolds v. Sims,' 2 and its
progeny, which articulated and enforced the constitutional principle of "one
person/one vote."
Closely related to the Court's reapportionment decision was the Equal
Protection doctrine of implied fundamental rights. Prior to 1969, the Court had
hinted on several occasions that the rational basis standard of review might not
be applicable classifications that penalize the exercise of such rights. Building
upon these intimations, Brennan held in Shapiro v. Thompson,'3 that a law that
denied welfare assistance to residents who had not resided within the jurisdiction
for at least one year immediately prior to their application for assistance
penalized the right to interstate travel by denying newcomers "welfare aid upon
which may depend the ability of families to subsist." Brennan concluded that
because the classification penalized an implied fundamental right it amounted to
unconstitutional "invidious discrimination" unless it was "necessary to promote
9. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
10. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
11. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
13. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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a compelling governmental interest." Brennan's opinion in Shapiro crystallized
the implied fundamental rights doctrine and thus opened the door to a series of
subsequent decisions invalidating classifications that unequally affected the right
to vote, the right to be listed on the ballot, the right to travel, and the right to
use contraceptive.
Although Brennan played a central role in shaping the Equal Protection
doctrine in the 1960s, by the 1970s and 1980s he often found himself fighting
rear-guard actions in an effort to protect his earlier Equal Protection decisions,
particularly in the areas of reapportionment and implied fundamental rights.
Occasionally, however, he won a hard-earned victory. In Plyer v. Doe,4 for
example, Brennan mustered a five-Justice majority to invalidate a Texas statute
that denied free public education to children who had not been legally admitted
into the United States. Although conceding that education is not a fundamental
right and that undocumented aliens are not a suspect class, Brennan nonetheless
persuaded four of his colleagues that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate
because the statute imposed "a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children
not accountable for their disabling status."
As these decisions suggest, Brennan was consistently ready and willing
actively to assert judicial authority to enforce the constitution's guarantee of "the
Equal Protection of the Laws." This same activism was evident in Brennan's
due process opinions as well. Goldberg v. Kelly,"3 is perhaps the best
example. Traditionally, the Court defined the "liberty" and "property" interests
protected by the Due -Process Clause by reference to the common law. If
government took someone's property or invaded his bodily integrity, the Court
held that the Due Process Clause required some kind of hearing; but if
government denied an individual some public benefit to which he had no
common law right, such as public employment, a license or welfare, the Court
deemed the clause inapplicable. This doctrine seemed increasingly formalistic
with the twentieth century expansion of governmental benefit programs and
governmental participation in the economy, for while more and more individuals
grew increasingly dependent upon government, prevailing doctrine gave no
constitutional protection against even the most arbitrary withdrawal of
governmental benefits.
In Goldberg, Brennan dramatically redefined the scope of the interests
protected by the Due Process Clause. Brennan explained that "much of the
existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not fall within
traditional common law concepts of property," and it is "realistic today to
14. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
15. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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regard welfare entitlement as more like property than a 'gratuity.'" This being
so, Brennan held that a state could not constitutionally terminate public
assistance benefits without affording the recipient the opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing prior to termination. In this opinion, Brennan launched a
new era in the extension of Due Process rights, and in subsequent decisions, the
Court, building upon Goldberg, held that the suspension of drivers' licenses,
the terminating of public employment, the revocation of parole, the termination
of food stamps, and similar matters all must be undertaken in accordance with
the demands of due process.
Despite his extraordinary contributions to governing principles of our Equal
Protection and Due Process jurisprudence, Brennan's greatest legacy may be in
the area of free expression. When Brennan joined the Court, the country was
in the throes of its efforts to suppress communism, and this undoubtedly affected
Brennan's views on free expression. Brennan's influence on the Court in this
area of the law was felt almost immediately. Two years before Brennan's
appointment, the Court in Barsky v. Board of Regents, 6 reaffirmed the
right/privilege distinction in upholding the suspension of a physician's medical
license because of events arising out of his communist affiliations. Four years
later, in Speiser v. Randall,7 Brennan's opinion for the court explicitly rejected
the right/privilege distinction. Speiser involved a California law that established
a special property tax exemption for veterans, but denied the exemption to any
veteran who advocated the violent overthrow of government. Brennan rejected
the state's argument that the disqualification was lawful because it merely
withheld a "privilege":
To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of
speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent
effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech.
The appellees are plainly mistaken in their argument that, because a
tax exemption is a 'privilege' . . . its denial may not infringe speech.
Brennan's rejection of the right/privilege distinction in Speiser was a critical
step in the evolution of First Amendment doctrine. It did not, however, end the
case, and Brennan proceeded to articulate a second -- and equally important --
principle of First Amendment doctrine. Turning to the procedure mandated by
the California law, Brennan held that the law violated the First Amendment
because it required the applicant to prove that he had not advocated the violent
overthrow of government. Brennan explained that "the vice of the present
procedure is that, where particular speech falls close to the line separating the
16. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
17. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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lawful and the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken fact-finding - inherent in all
litigation - will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be
penalized." Moreover, "the man who knows that he must bring forth proof and
persuade another if the lawfulness of his conduct must steer far wider of the
unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens."
This emphasis on the procedure by which government regulates expression
was a hallmark of Brennan's First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, Brennan
was the principal architect of both the First Amendment vagueness principle and
the overbreadth doctrine. Brennan first fully articulated the vagueness principle
in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,'8 which invalidated a New York law
prohibiting school teachers from uttering "seditious" words. Building upon his
opinion in Speiser, Brennan grounded the vagueness principle in his observation
that "when one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose him his position,
one necessarily will steer far wider of the unlawful zone."
Brennan first coined the term "overbreadth" in NAACP v. Buton,9 and
he first fully explained the rationale of the doctrine in Gooding v. Wilson
The transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing 'attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.' . . . This is deemed
necessary because person whose expression is constitutionally
protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of
criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to
protected expression.
Brennan's view on free expression were influenced not only by
governmental efforts to suppress communism, but by the civil rights movement
as well. In NAACP v. Button,2' for example, Brennan held that a Virginia law
prohibiting any organization to retain a lawyer in connection with litigation to
which it was not a party was unconstitutional as applied to the activities of the
NAACP. Brennan explained that "in the context of NAACP objectives,
litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for
[achieving] equality of treatment [for] the members of the Negro community."
In such circumstances, litigation "is a form of political expression," and "groups
which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot
18. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
19. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
20. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
21. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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frequently turn to the courts." Indeed, for the group whom the NAACP assists,
"litigation may be the most effective form of political association." By bringing
litigation within the ambit of First Amendment protection, Brennan's opinion for
the Court in Button both highlighted the central role of courts as effective
instruments of political and social change and, at the same time, empowered
organizations like the NAACP to aggressively pursue the vindication of
constitutional rights without obstruction from often hostile state governments.
Perhaps Brennan's most important First Amendment opinion, New York
lTimes v. Sullivan," also grew out of the civil rights movement. At issue in
Sullivan was the Alabama law of libel, which permitted a public official to
recover damages for defamatory statements unless the speaker could prove that
the statements were true. The case itself was brought by a Montgomery city
commissioner on the basis of several inaccurate statements contained in an
advertisement that described the civil rights movement and concluded with an
appeal for funds. An Alabama jury found in favor of the commissioner and
awarded him damages in the amount of $500,000.
Prior to Sullivan, it was settled doctrine that libelous utterances were
"unprotected" by the First Amendment and could be regulated without raising
"any constitutional problem." With a sensitivity to the history of seditious libel
and an awareness of the dangers even civil libel action pose to free and open
debate in cases like Sullivan, Brennan rejected settled doctrine and held that
"libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations." To the
contrary, libel "must be measured by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment." Moreover, considering the case "against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, " 2 Brennan maintained that the
"advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major
public issues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for Constitutional
protection." Balancing the competing interests, Brennan concluded that, because
"erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate" and must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need... to
survive,' "the First Amendment must be understood to prohibit any public
official to recover damages for libel unless "he proves that the statement was
made with 'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
Brennan also played a central role in the evolution of the law of obscenity.
In Roth v. United States,' the Court's first confrontation with the obscenity
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. Id. at 270.
24. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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issue, Brennan wrote for the Court that obscenity is "utterly without redeeming
social importance" and is thus "not within the area of Constitutionally protected
speech." Characteristically, however, Brennan emphasized that "sex and
obscenity are not synonymous" and that it is "vital that the standards for judging
obscenity safeguard the protection of... material which does not treat sex in
a manner appealing to prurient interest." Sixteen years later, after struggling
without success to satisfactorily define "obscenity," Brennan came to the
conclusion that the very concept is so inherently vague that it was impossible to
"bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing fundamental First
Amendment values." Brennan therefor concluded in his dissenting opinion in
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,' that "at least in the absence of distribution
to juveniles or obtrusive expose to unconsenting adults," the First Amendment
prohibits the suppression of "sexually oriented materials on the basis of their
allegedly 'obscene' contents." Not surprisingly, this analysis once again
revealed the essential touchstones of Brennan's First Amendment jurisprudence -
- a recognition of the need for precision of regulation and a sensitivity to the
practical dynamics of governmental efforts to limit expression. As Brennan
cautioned in Paris Adult Theatre, "in the absence of some very substantial
interest" in suppressing even low-value speech, "we can hardly condone the ill
effects that seem to flow inevitably from the effort."
As in the Equal Protection area, and as suggested in Paris Adult Theatre,
Brennan spent most of his energies in free speech cases in the 1970s and 1980s
in dissent. This was especially true in cases involving content-neutral
regulations of expression, such as Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness,' and cases involving the regulation of sexually-oriented
expression, such as FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.' As in the equal protection
area, however, Brennan won a few notable victories. In Elrod v. Burns,' for
example, Brennan wrote a plurality opinion holding the patronage practice of
dismissing public employees on a partisan basis violative of the First
Amendment; in Board of Education v. Pico,"s he wrote a plurality opinion
holding unconstitutional removal of books from a public school library; and in
Texas v. Johnson" and United States v. Eichman3' he wrote the opinions of
the Court holding that individuals who burned the American flag as a form of
political protest had engaged in constitutionally protected conduct that could not
be prohibited under a state flag desecration statute.
25. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
26. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
27. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
28. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
29. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
30. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
31. 110 S. Ct. 2404(1990).
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Brennan's opinion is in the realm of criminal procedure followed a similar
pattern - landmark opinions expanding civil liberties during the Warren Court,
vigorous and often bitter dissents during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
Brennan's earlier opinions are illustrated by Fay v. Noia,' Davis v.
Mississippi,33 and United States v. Wade.34 In Noia, Brennan significantly
expanded the availability of federal habeas corpus, holding the writ available not
only to persons challenging the jurisdiction of the convicting court, but to any
individual who was convicted in a proceeding that was "so fundamentally
defective as to make imprisonment... constitutionally intolerable." In Davis,
Brennan limited the use of dragnet investigations and invalidated as an
unreasonable search and seizure the detention of twenty-five black youths for
questioning and fingerprinting in connection with a rape investigation, where
there were no reasonable grounds to believe that any particular individual was
the assailant. And in Wade, Brennan held that courtroom identifications of an
accused must be excluded from evidence where the accused was exhibited to
witnesses before trial at a post-indictment lineup without notice to the accused's
counsel. The common theme of these and other Brennan opinions in the area
of criminal procedure is that the judges must be especially vigilant to protect
those individuals whose rights to fair, decent, and equal treatment in the
criminal justice system might too easily be lost to intolerance, indifference,
ignorance, or haste.
William Brennan will be remembered as one of the most influential Justices
in the history of the United States Supreme Court. Throughout his long and
distinguished tenure, Brennan unflinchingly championed the rights of the poor,
the unrepresented, and the powerless. There are, of course, those who
challenge Brennan's vision of the Constitution, but there can be no doubt that
for more than three decades, Brennan expressed his unique and powerful vision
of the Constitution as "a vital charter of human liberty" with rare eloquence,
intelligence, clarity, and courage.
32. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
33. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
34. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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